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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the order of summary 
judgment in favor of the Sandy City Board of Adjustment was entered December 21, 
2000. 2000 UT App 371 [reproduced in Addendum as Exhibit "A"] The Utah 
Supreme Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this case by Order dated 
June 28, 2001 and has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2-2(5) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is whether the Court of Appeals correctly 
adopted the rule in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) to 
govern determination of issues where the law has changed but a party fails to appeal 
Standard of Review: When exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals not of the trial court. 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997). When reviewing 
questions of law, the Utah Supreme Court accords no particular deference to the 
conclusions of law made by the court of appeals but reviews them for correctness. 
Allen v. Utah Deft of Health, 850 P.2d 1267,1269 (Utah 1993). 
CONTROLLING LEGAL PROVISIONS 
None. This case involves the interpretation of case law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action by John Collins and June Collins against the 
Sandy City Board of Adjustment and Sandy City Corporation for review of a decision 
by the Sandy City Board of Adjustment denying non-conforming use status for 
certain real properties located in Sandy City owned by John and June Collins that had 
been utilized as short-term rentals prior to the enactment by Sandy City of an 
ordinance prohibiting such short-term rentals. 
On October 27, 1998 the Petitioners John and June Collins filed an 
application for non-conforming use status with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment. 
This application was denied on November 12, 1998. The Petitioners filed a Petition 
for Review on December 11, 1998. (R. 1-6) Cross motions for summary judgment 
were subsequently filed (R. 15-16; 140-141) and the Motions were argued on August 
16,1999. (R. 431) 
The District Court granted the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied the Petitioners' Motion. (R. 446-448; Add. 1-3 ) Petitioners filed this 
appeal on December 16, 1999. (R. 449-450 ). On December 21, 2000 the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment of the District Court. [2000 UT 
App. 371]. The Utah Supreme Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari by 
Order dated June 28, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioners are the owners of certain real properties located within the 
boundaries of Sandy City. For a lengthy period of time prior to March, 1996, the 
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Petitioners utilized the properties as short-term rental properties, sometimes referred 
to as "ski rentals". In March, 1996 the respondent Sandy City Corporation issued a 
cease and desist order requiring the petitioners to cease using the properties for that 
purpose. (R. 28 ) Sandy City did not at that time pass an ordinance prohibiting 
short-term rentals but relied instead on the existing ordinance, arguing that such use 
was already prohibited. 
The Petitioners filed an appeal to the respondent Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment in 1996, which upheld Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy zoning 
ordinances to preclude such use by the petitioners. Petitioners appealed that decision 
to the Third District Court and the District Court upheld the decision of the Sandy 
City Board of Adjustment. The Revised Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal 
was signed November 17, 1997 and dated September 29, 1997. [Third District Court 
Case No. 960905929CV] (R. 210 ) 
On March 26, 1998 the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision in a case 
involving precisely the same issues as those presented by the Petitioners herein in the 
above-referenced 1996 case which was pending at the same time as the petitioners' 
1996 case, in Brown, et al vs. Sandy City Board of Adjustment; and Sandy, a political 
subdivision of Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) That case, decided March 26, 
1998, held that Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy City Development Code to 
prohibit leases of less than thirty days in residential zones was not a correct 
interpretation, i.e.,-Sandy City had no valid ordinance prohibiting short-term leases in 
Sandy City. The respondent Sandy City then imposed a temporary moratorium on 
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short-term rentals, allegedly effective March 27, 1998, and subsequently enacted 
ordinances prohibiting short-term leases. (R. 36-45) 
On or about October 27, 1998, the petitioners filed an application for 
determination of non-conforming status on their properties with the Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment (R. 50) That application was heard by the Board on 
November 12, 1998. The Sandy City Board of Adjustment denied the petitioners' 
application for determination of non-conforming use status on the petitioners' 
properties, apparently relying on the 1996 District Court decision which denied the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by John and June Collins and granted the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sandy City Corporation. (R. 446-448) 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of that decision in Case No. 980912601 in the 
Third District Court. On cross motions for summary judgment the District Court 
ruled that because the Petitioners/Appellants had not appealed the prior order in 
Third District Court Case No. 960905929CV, that case was res judicata in the present 
case (Case No. 980912601) and precluded the Petitioners/Appellants from obtaining 
non-conforming use status on the subject properties. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding 
that because the Appellants, John Collins and June Collins, chose not to pursue an 
appeal of the 1996 District Court decision, they could not benefit from the change of 
law exception to res judicata where, had they chosen to appeal, the change of law 
would have been obtained. [2000 UT App. 371] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in its holding that the intervening change in 
the law in this case did not operate as a defense to Sandy City's claim that the 1998 
suit filed by Mr. and Mrs. Collins was barred under principles of res judicata by the 
Summary Judgment entered in the 1996 suit between the same parties. 
Barring the Petitioners from proceeding in the 1998 suit does nothing to 
further the traditional purposes of issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Applying res 
judicata as a bar in this case only perpetuates an erroneous ruling without valid 
reasons. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY 
ADOPTED THE RULE IN FEDERATED 
DEPARTMENT STORES v. MOITIE TO GOVERN 
DETERMINATION OF ISSUES WHERE THE 
INTERVENING LAW HAS CHANGED BUT A PARTY 
FAILS TO APPEAL. 
The Court of Appeals ruled in this case that in a situation where one party in 
cases litigating the same legal issue chooses not to pursue an appeal, that party may 
not benefit from the change of law exception to res judicata where had that party 
chosen to appeal the change of law would have been obtained. 2000 UT App 371, 16 
P. 3d 1251, 1256 (Utah App. 2000) In so holding, the Utah Court of Appeals failed 
to properly apply additional principles recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as 
necessary in cases where issue preclusion is in dispute. The case of Norman v. Murray 
First Thrift <& Loan Co., 596 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1979) requires the lower court, in 
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examining the issue of whether principles of res judicata should constitute a bar to 
this action, to further inquire as to whether the controlling facts or legal principles 
have changed significantly since the prior judgment. In that case the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
"To determine whether it is appropriate to apply collateral estoppel 
necessitates three further inquiries: First, whether the issues presented 
in the current litigation are in substance the same as resolved in the 
prior litigation; second, whether the controlling facts or legal principles have 
changed significantly since the priorjudgment [emphasis added]; third, 
whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal 
rules of preclusion." At 1032. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the instant case agreed that it is the general rule 
that a subsequent change in the operative facts or the controlling law has generally 
relieved a party from the application of res judicata, and further agreed that, in the 
instant case, the law had changed since the 1996 suit. Collins v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment, 16 P. 3d 1251, 1254 (Utah App. 2000). The Utah Court of Appeals 
declined to apply the general rule in this case, relying on the case of Federated 
Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981). 
The Court of Appeals asserts that Moitie, supra, is a case strikingly similar to 
the case Mr. and Mrs. Collins have brought. If one examines the facts in each case, 
however, the instant case bears little resemblance to the situation presented in Moitie. 
In the Moitie case, the change in the law that occurred was entirely unanticipated, 
whereas in this case, Brown, supra, was a fully prepared appeal pending before the 
Court of Appeals when the Collins' 1996 District Court decision was rendered. It 
made no sense to file an appeal when a fully briefed appeal was already pending. 
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Judicial economy would dictate that Mr. and Mrs. Collins simply await the outcome in 
Brown. 
Unlike the petitioners in Moitie, Mr. and Mrs. Collins were not forum shopping 
and they were not trying to mount a collateral attack.. Further, unlike the Moitie case, 
the Petitioners in this case were not originally parties to the action that resulted in the 
Brown decision. 
Since Brown ruled there was no ordinance in Sandy City prohibiting short-term 
rentals, Brown also essentially established that it was legal for everyone, including Mr. 
and Mrs. Collins, to rent, or to have rented, residential property7 in Sandy for the short-
term. Sandy City, having been a party to the Brown case as well as the case with Mr. 
and Mrs. Collins, was collaterally estopped, by virtue of Brown, from asserting that it 
had a valid ordinance prohibiting short-term leases as against any property owner in 
Sandy City, prior to the enactment of a valid ordinance. Hill vs. Seattle First Nat. Bank, 
827 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1992) 
The additional inquiry set forth in Norman v. Murray First Thrift <& ljoan Co., 
supra, should govern in this case. The facts in the instant case are not similar to the 
facts in Moitie. The instant case was not a complex, multi-party suit involving 
questions of federal and state law. While Moitie is controlling case law in the federal 
court system, Moitie did not overrule Norman and there are valid reasons for applying 
the analysis set forth in Norman to the facts in the instant case. 
The Brown decision essentially stated that Sandy City had no ordinance in 
effect that would prohibit any property owner in Sandy City from leasing their 
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property short term. Every property owner utilizing his property for that purpose 
prior to the enactment of a valid ordinance prohibiting such use would be eligible for 
"grandfathering" under the non-conforming use ordinance. However, in the instant 
case, the Petitioners John and June Collins are foreclosed from benefiting from the 
holding in Brown because they did not appeal a District Court ruling that was 
overruled by Brown. This is manifestly unjust and unfair. In the concurring opinion 
in Moitie, supra, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
"First, I, for one, would not close the door upon the possibility 
that there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must 
give way to what the Court of Appeals referred to as 'overriding 
concerns of public policy and simple justice.5 Professor Moore 
has noted: 'Just as res judicata is occasionally qualified by an 
overriding, competing principle of public policy, so occasionally it 
needs an equitable tempering.' " [citation omitted] 452 U.S. 394, 403. 
Likewise, in the case of Reed v. Allen, cited in Moitie, Justice Cardozo wrote, in dissent, 
concerning the application of the doctrine of res judicata, "A system of procedure is 
perverted from its" proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without 
the warrant of clear necessity." 286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932). 
The instant case is a case where the doctrine of res judicata needs an equitable 
tempering. John and June Collins are essentially being penalized for pursuing their 
legal remedy. They cannot benefit from the holding in Brown but any other property 
owner wTho did not pursue a legal remedy prior to Brown can benefit. This is an unfair 
and unjust result, and it serves no valid, judicial purpose. Such a result simply 
perpetuates the trial court's erroneous ruling in the 1996 case. Appellate courts of 
other jurisdictions have declined to apply res judicata as a bar in these circumstances. 
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In the case of Cassidy v. Board of Education, 557 A.2d 227 (Md. 1989), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland considered the issue of whether a plaintiff could sue the Board 
of Education even though her prior suit was dismissed for failure to allege notice to 
the Board. An intervening appellate court decision had ruled that educational boards 
were not municipal organizations and thus were not subject to the notice provision in 
question. IdL at 233. The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that continuing to apply 
the notice statute in that case would compel Cassidy to meet a standard no other 
plaintiff needed to meet and would provide the Board with a windfall by way of a 
mistake which could still be corrected. I d at 234. That Court, citing the Restatement 
(Second) §28(2), held that "where there has been an intervening change in the applicable 
legal context, an issue of law may be relitigated to avoid an inequitable administration 
of the laws." Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals further stated that, "Our 
conclusion that issue preclusion does not apply here is consistent with the rule's 
traditional purpose. The rule 'is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters 
which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually 
and legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have become 
obsolete or erroneous with time.' . . . " [citation omitted] Cassidy v. Board of Education, 
557 A. 2d 227, 234 (Md. 1989). 
Other state courts have likewise held that res judicata and its related doctrines 
are flexible, not absolute, and should give way in extraordinary circumstances such as 
a change in law. See, e.g., Snyder v. Newcomb Oil Co., Inc., 603 N.Y.S. 2d 1010 (A.D. 4 
Dept. 1993); Foley v. Roche, 447 N.Y.S. 2d 528 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1982). This is consistent 
10 
with the general rule that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions 
operate retrospectively because they theoretically reflect interpretations of laws as 
they always should have been. United States vs. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 
(1982). 
In the case at bar, applying issue preclusion as a bar to the 1998 suit by Mr. 
and Mrs. Collins does nothing to further the traditional purpose of the rule barring 
relitigation of issues between the same parties. On the contrary, it gives Sandy City 
the right to perpetuate an erroneous ruling as to one property owner while it is 
precluded from applying that ruling to every other property owner, similarly situated, 
in its jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The intervening change in the law effected by Brown, et. al v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) established that the ruling of the District 
Court in the 1996 case filed by John Collins and June Collins against Sandy City was 
erroneous and it is therefore inappropriate to apply issue preclusion in this case under 
the principles enunciated by this Court in Norman v. Murray First Thrift <& luoan 
Company, supra. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed that Norman correctly stated the 
law that a subsequent change in the controlling law generally relieves a party from the 
application of res judicata. The Court of Appeals also agreed that there had been a 
change in the law in this case. Applying issue preclusion in this case does nothing to 
further the traditional purpose of that rule. It would only serve to perpetuate an error 
and achieves an inequitable and unjust result in the context of this case. 
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This Court should apply the principles enunciated in Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Co., supra, reversing the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals based 
upon the intervening change in law brought about by Brown, et. al. v. Sandy City Board 
oj Adjustment, supra. This would be consistent with the general rule that judicial 
decisions be applied retrospectively to reflect an interpretation of the law as it should 
have been. 
Dated this day of November, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Franklin L. Slaugh 
Attorney for Petitioners-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant were mailed, first class postage prepaid, this day of November, 2001 
to the following: 
Steven C. Osborn 
Sandy City Attorney 
10000 Centennial Parkway 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Kl John and June Collins (Collins) appeal from summary judgment 
in favor of the Sandy City Board of Adjustment (Board). We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 The Collins own certain real properties located in R-l-8 
residential zones in Sandy City.1 The Collins claim they used 
the properties as short-term rentals (rentals of less than thirty 
days) until March 26, 1996 when Sandy City ordered them to cease 
such use. Sandy City claimed their use was in violation of a 
1. The properties at issue on appeal include those located at 
1875 East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South, and 9255 Maison 
Drive. The property located at 1456 East Longdale Drive was not 
part of the trial court's order and therefore is not properly 
before this court on appeal. 
zoning ordinance which the City claimed prohibited short-term 
rentals. 
%3 The Collins appealed the cease and desist order to the 
Board. The Board upheld the City's interpretation of the 
ordinance. The Collins appealed the decision of the Board to the 
third district court, which affirmed the Board's decision. 
1|4 The Collins did not appeal the district court's decision. 
Rather, they chose to await the outcome of Brown et al. v. Sandy 
City Board of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
which involved the same issue of whether the Sandy City Land 
Development Code prohibited short-term rentals in R-l-8 and R-l-
10 residential zones as the Board and district court had 
concluded. See id. at 212. In Brown, this court held that 
"short-term leases of residential properties are not prohibited 
by the zoning ordinance," and thus invalidated the City's 
interpretation of the ordinance.2 Id. In response to Brown, 
Sandy City placed a moratorium on all short-term rentals, 
effective March 27, 1998, see Sandy City, Utah, Ordinance No. 98-
19, and thereafter, on September 1, 1998, amended the ordinance 
specifically prohibiting short-term leases. See Sandy City, 
Utah, Ordinance No. 98-35. 
1|5 On October 27, 1998, the Collins filed an application with 
the Board seeking nonconforming use status on their properties. 
The Board denied the application because the Collins did not 
establish that they were using the properties as short-term 
rentals on March 27, 1998, the effective date of the moratorium. 
%6 The Collins appealed the Board's decision to the trial 
court. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court 
entered summary judgment for the Board on all properties. The 
trial court held that the Collins* claim was barred on the 
grounds of res judicata because the Collins failed to appeal the 
1996 trial court decision. Additionally, the trial court found 
that the properties did not qualify for nonconforming use status 
because the Collins had failed to produce evidence to show that 
they were using their properties as short-term rentals on March 
27, 1998, and that the Collins had failed to produce evidence to 
show that their use of the properties was in conformity with the 
applicable zoning ordinances. The Collins appeal. 
2. It is undisputed that, had the Collins appealed, they would 
also have obtained this result. 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1|7 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "We 
review a grant of summary judgment for correctness." Baczuk v. 
Salt Lake Rea'l Med. Ctr., 2000 UT App 225,115, 8 P.3d 1037 
(citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
ij8 The doctrine of res judicata comprises two different 
branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Issue preclusion is 
before us in this appeal. Issue preclusion, often referred to as 
collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation of issues already 
determined in a previous action. See id. at 250. Issue 
preclusion applies if four requirements are met: 
First, the issue in both cases must be 
identical. Second, the judgment must be 
final with respect to that issue. Third, the 
issue must have been fully, fairly, and 
competently litigated in the first action. 
Fourth, the party who is precluded from 
litigating the issue must be either a party 
to the first action or a privy of a party. 
Id. "If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there 
can be no issue preclusion." Hill v. Seattle First Nat'1 Bank, 
827 P.2d 241, 245 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). 
f9 The Collins concede that three of the four requirements of 
issue preclusion are met but argue that the issues in the 1996 
case and this case are not identical. The Collins argue that in 
the 1996 action the issue was whether the current Sandy City 
ordinances prohibited leases of dwellings for terms of less than 
thirty days. In this action, they argue that the issue presented 
is whether they are entitled to a nonconforming use status 
because of their use prior to the 1998 ordinance. 
KlO The Board responds that the central issue in the 1996 action 
was whether short-term rentals were lawful. The Board asserts 
that the legality of short-term rentals is also central to the 
Collins1 claim for nonconforming use status because to qualify 
for a nonconforming use the applicant must show that the use was 
legally established and continued before the enactment or 
effective date of the restrictive legislation. See Sandy City, 
Utah, Rev. Dev. Code § 15-24-2. 
991068-CA 3 
Ull In support of its position, the Board cites Robertson v. 
Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983) . In Robertson, the issue was 
whether a finding of undue influence in the execution of a will 
collaterally estopped relitigation of the issue of undue 
influence as to a trust. See id. at 1230-31. The defendant 
argued that collateral estoppel was not applicable because the 
issue tried and resolved in the first case, the validity of a 
will, was different than that in the second, the validity of a 
trust. See id. at 1230. 
Hl2 The court stated that "[w]hat is critical is whether the 
issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was essential 
to resolution of that suit and is the same factual issue as that 
raised in the second suit." Id. (citing Searle Bros, v. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978)). The court held that relitigation 
of the issue of undue influence was collaterally estopped because 
the validity or invalidity of the will was a legal conclusion 
based on the factual finding of undue influence. See id. 
fl3 The court reasoned that: 
,f[I]t is not the identity of the thing sued 
for, or of the cause of action, which 
determines the conclusiveness of a former 
judgment upon a subsequent action, but merely 
the identity of the issue involved in the two 
suits. If an issue presented in a subsequent 
suit between the same parties or their 
privies is shown to have been determined in a 
former one, the question is res judicata [or 
collateral estoppel], although the actions 
are based on different grounds, or tried on 
different theories, or are instituted for 
different purposes and seek different 
relief." 
Id. (quoting Pickeral v. Federal Land Bank, 15 S.E.2d 82, 85 
(1941)) (alterations in original). 
Hl4 We conclude Robertson defeats the Collins' claim that 
because the actions are based on different legal grounds-
legality of short-term rentals versus noncomforming use--they are 
not identical issues. Because the central issue in the 1996 
action was the legality of the short-term rentals under the 
ordinance, and in this suit we must determine that the pre-1996 
use was lawful in order to establish a valid nonconforming use, 
the same issue is involved. 
Hl5 The Collins next argue that, regardless of whether the 
issues in the 1996 suit and this suit are identical, because of 
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an intervening change in the law, they should not be barred under 
the principles of res judicata. 
1(16 The Collins cite dicta from Norman v. Murray First Thrift & 
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that in 
addition to the four requirements of issue preclusion, the court 
must further inquire as to "whether the controlling facts or 
legal principles have changed significantly since the prior 
judgment." Id. at 1032. This statement of dicta has never been 
cited in subsequent Utah case law. Nonetheless, we agree that it 
is the general rule that a subsequent change in the operative 
facts or the controlling law has generally relieved a party from 
the application of res judicata. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162, 65 S. Ct. 573, 576 (1945); 
Community Hosp. v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Muchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1962); Wagner 
v. Baron, 64 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1953); Statler v. Catalano, 
691 N.E.2d 384, 386-87 (111. Ct. App. 1997); Blevins v. Johnson, 
344 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky. 1961); Farrow v. Brown, 873 S.W.2d 918, 
920-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v. J.P. Lamb Land Co., 401 
N.W.2d 713, 718 (N.D. 1987); Marino v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990). 
i|l7 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 
U.S. 154, 65 S. Ct. 573 (1945), the Supreme Court stated that "it 
is . . . the general rule that res judicata is no defense where 
between the time of the first judgment and the second there has 
been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an 
altered situation." Id. at 162, 65 S. Ct. at 576. 
Ul8 An illustrative case is Statler v. Catalano, 691 N.E.2d 384 
(111. Ct. App. 1997). Statler dealt with a dispute over the 
rights to the surface waters of a lake. See id. at 385. The 
court determined that, under the prevailing case law, the 
plaintiffs only had a right to use a portion of the lake rather 
than the whole. See id. Seven years later, the plaintiffs filed 
suit again seeking a declaration of their right to use the entire 
lake. See id. The defendant moved to dismiss under the doctrine 
of res judicata. See id. The trial court denied the motion, 
finding that a subsequent change in the case law rendered res 
judicata inapplicable. See id. at 385-86. 
Hl9 In affirming the trial court, the Illinois Court of Appeals 
reasoned that 
[e]ven though the basic facts have not 
changed, it is generally accepted that [r]es 
judicata does not operate as an automatic bar 
where between the time of the first judgment 
and the second there has been an intervening 
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decision or a change in the law creating an 
altered situation. 
Id. at 386-87 (citation omitted). 
H20 In the instant case, the interpretation of the ordinance the 
Board relied on, and which the district court held barred the 
Collins from using their properties as short-term rentals in the 
original 1996 action, was invalidated in Brown. Brown clearly 
held the ordinance in question did not bar short-term rentals. 
See Brown, 957 P.2d at 212. Thus the law has changed since the 
1996 suit. 
1|21 The Board responds claiming that res judicata is not 
defeated by a subsequent change in the law when a party elects to 
forgo an opportunity to appeal the first adverse judgment, and 
stands by while others with the same legal claim pursue appeals 
which result in the change in the law. 
K22 The Board relies on Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. 
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981), a case strikingly 
similar to the one before us. In Moitie, seven civil class 
actions were brought against owners of various department stores 
alleging violation of federal antitrust law. See id. at 395, 101 
S. Ct. at 2426. The district court dismissed all of the actions 
in their entirety concluding that the purchasers had not alleged 
an "injury" to their "business or property" within the meaning of 
the Clayton Act. See id. at 396, 101 S. Ct. at 2426. 
Plaintiffs in five of the suits appealed the judgment to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit while two of 
the plaintiffs did not, choosing instead to re-file their claims 
in state court. See id. at 395, 101 S. Ct. at 2427. 
H23 After removal of the state claims to federal court, the 
federal district court concluded that the claims were essentially 
the same as those decided in the original federal action and 
dismissed them under the doctrine of res judicata. See id. at 
397, 101 S. Ct. at 2427. Subsequently, the United States Supreme 
Court in an unrelated case held that retail purchasers can suffer 
an "injury" to their "business or property" under the Clayton 
Act. See id. Based on this decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
and remanded the five class actions that had been appealed and 
were before the court. See id. When the two other cases came 
before the Ninth Circuit, the court again reversed, refusing to 
apply res judicata, reasoning that "non-appealing parties may 
benefit from a reversal when their position is closely interwoven 
with that of appealing parties." Id. at 398, 101 S. Ct. at 2427 
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court reversed. 
6 
H24 The Court reasoned that 
an "erroneous conclusion" reached by the 
court in the first suit does not deprive the 
defendants in the second action "of their 
right to rely upon the plea of res judicata. 
. . . A judgment merely voidable because 
based upon an erroneous view of the law is 
not open to collateral attack, but can be 
corrected only by a direct review and not by 
bringing another action upon the same cause 
[of action] ." We have observed that " [the] 
indulgence of a contrary view would result in 
creating elements of uncertainty and 
confusion and in undermining the conclusive 
character of judgments, consequences which it 
was the very purpose of the doctrine of res 
judicata to avert." 
Id. at 398-99, 101 S. Ct. at 2448 (quoting Reed v. Allen. 286 
U.S. 191, 201, 52 S. Ct. 532, 534 (1932)) (alterations in 
original). The Court also noted that the "respondents here made 
a calculated choice to forgo their appeals," id. at 400-01, 101 
S. Ct. at 2429, and that 
11
 [t]he predicament in which respondent finds 
himself is of his own making. . . . [We] 
cannot be expected, for his sole relief, to 
upset the general and well-established 
doctrine of res judicata, conceived in the 
light of the maxim that the interest of the 
state requires that there be an end to 
litigation--a maxim which comports with 
common sense as well as public policy." 
Id. at 401-02, 101 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Reed. 286 U.S. at 198-
99, 52 S. Ct. at 533) (alterations in original). This language 
is similar to that used by the Court in Ackermann v. United 
States. 340 U.S. 193, 71 S. Ct. 209 (1950), which stated that 
"[p]etitioner made a considered choice not to appeal. . . [h]is 
choice was a risk, but calculated and deliberate and such as 
follows a free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a 
choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his 
decision not to appeal was probably wrong. . . . There must be 
an end to the litigation someday, and free, calculated, 
deliberate choices are not to be relieved from." Id. at 198, 71 
S. Ct. at 211-12. 
1125 The case before us presents virtually the same factual 
situation as was presented in Moitie. The Collins deliberately 
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chose to forgo their appeal, instead choosing to rely on the 
outcome of the appeal of the same legal issue in Brown. The 
Collins now seek to be relieved from their "considered choice not 
to appeal," and to benefit from the change in the law which they 
could have obtained but which they chose not to pursue.3 
i|26 This refusal to allow a non-appealing party to benefit from 
the normal change of law exception to collateral estoppel has 
also been recognized by our sister state courts. See Gail v. 
Western Convenience Stores, 434 N.W.2d 862, 863 (Iowa 1989) 
(stating "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed 
judgment on the merits are not altered by the fact that the 
judgment may have been wrong or rested on legal principles later 
overruled in another case"); Ellis v. Whittaker, 709 P.2d 991, 
994 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to vacate judgment on basis of 
subsequent decision changing law because of failure to appeal 
judgment); Cleveland v. Ohio Pep't of Mental Health, 618 N.E.2d 
244, 247-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that failure to appeal 
judgment bars collateral attack even if judgment is based on 
erroneous view of law); see also Jachim v. Townsley, 619 N.E.2d 
1317, 1319 (111. Ct. App. 1993); Whenery v. Whenery, 652 P.2d 
1188, 1192 (N.M. 1982); In re Marriage of Vinson, 644 P.2d 635, 
638 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) . 
[^27 Although Utah's courts have not specifically dealt with a 
Moitie res judicata situation, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 
1981), cited Moitie for the proposition that a final order, 
"unless reversed on appeal, is res judicata and binding." Id. at 
3. The Collins quote language from Arizona v. California, 460 
U.S. 605, 103 S. Ct. 1382 (1983), in an attempt to bolster their 
argument that a subsequent change of law bars application of res 
judicata. Arizona v. California involved a dispute over water 
rights between several western states and Indian tribes. See id. 
One of the issues before the Court was whether to modify a prior 
adjudication and decree involving water rights within reservation 
boundaries. See id. at 615-16, 103 S. Ct. at 1389. 
In Arizona, the Court stated that res judicata did not apply 
because there was a provision in the decree that allowed the 
Court to retain jurisdiction and modify, amend, or supplement the 
same where appropriate. See id. at 618, 103 S. Ct. at 13 91. It 
was the propriety of doing the same that the Court was dealing 
with in Arizona, a wholly different set of circumstances than 
those before us. See id. The Court merely touched on the 
general rules of preclusion, noting that while they "are not 
strictly applicable, the principles upon which these rules are 
founded should inform our decision." Id. at 619, 103 S. Ct at 
1391. 
8 
1065 (citing Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); 
Moitie. 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424). 
1f2 8 In Piacitelli, the plaintiff commenced action against 
Southern Utah State College (SUSC) alleging that its failure to 
renew his employment contract was a dismissal for cause and 
violated his rights under SUSC personnel policies. See id. at 
1064. SUSC argued that the plaintiff's contract was on a year-
to-year basis and thus expired on its own terms. See id. The 
trial court held that the plaintiff was not on a year-to-year 
contract and thus the procedures in the policy governed. See id, 
at 1065. The Utah Supreme Court noted that because the order of 
the trial court was not appealed it was binding upon the parties. 
See id. Thus, the court treated the plaintiff as an employee 
with permanent status who was entitled to the procedures set 
forth in the SUSC policy. See id. 
i[29 We are persuaded by the reasoning of Moitie and similar 
cases. In a situation where one party in cases litigating the 
same legal issue chooses not to pursue an appeal, that party may 
not benefit from the change of law exception to res judicata 
where had that party chosen to appeal the change of law would 
have been obtained. Thus, we conclude the district court was 
correct in dismissing this case as it was barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata.4 
udith M. Billings, Judge 
H3 0 WE CONCUR; 
>amela "T. Greenwood, 
Pr e si.dirngv NJudge 
D a v i s , 
4. Because we agree with the trial court that the Collins' suit 
is barred on the grounds of res judicata we do not reach the 
other issues raised on appeal. 
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